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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
This matter comes before this court on David Paul 
Hammer's appeal from the judgment of conviction and 
sentence entered on November 4, 1998, in which the 
district court imposed a sentence of death. We will dismiss 
the appeal. 
 
On April 13, 1996, Hammer, then an inmate at 
USP/Allenwood in Pennsylvania, murdered Andrew Marti, 
another inmate, by strangulation within a cell in the special 
housing unit in Allenwood. Hammer was a state prisoner 
transferred to the federal system from Oklahoma pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. S 5003 and Marti was a federal prisoner 
serving a sentence for bank robbery. No question ever has 
been raised about the fact that Hammer committed the 
murder. 
 
A grand jury indicted Hammer for violations of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1111 (first degree murder within the special maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States) and 18 U.S.C. 
S 1118 (murder by a federal prisoner serving a life 
sentence). The court, however, on the government's motion, 
dismissed the section 1118 charge and thus Hammer 
ultimately went to trial solely on the section 1111 charge. 
Prior to the trial, the government served and filed a notice 
that it intended to seek the death penalty. While originally 
Hammer presented an insanity defense, during the trial he 
pleaded guilty to the murder, thus abandoning that 
defense. 
 
Thereafter the case was tried to the jury but only with 
respect to the sentence. On July 24, 1998, the jury 
returned a verdict recommending the imposition of the 
death sentence. Subsequently, Hammer filed a pro se 
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motion seeking an order discharging counsel and allowing 
him to proceed pro se and determine for himself whether to 
appeal. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on 
the motion. It received testimony from two highly qualified 
psychiatrists, Drs. John Mitchell and James Wolfson, who 
had examined Hammer. Their testimony is chronicled in 
the district court's opinion, United States v. Hammer, 25 F. 
Supp. 2d 518 (M.D. Pa. 1998). See especially the findings 
of fact 21-38, id. at 523-24. 
 
In the testimony cited in these findings, the psychiatrists 
canvassed the range of cognitive and emotional capacities 
relevant to the question whether Hammer was competent to 
waive his rights and whether his waiver was voluntary. 
They concluded that Hammer was fully competent, and 
that his decision to forego an appeal and ask for the 
immediate imposition and carrying out of the sentence of 
death was a competent and well reasoned decision. The 
district court also noted that the parties stipulated that 
none of the defense experts who testified at trial suggested 
that Hammer was incompetent at any relevant time. 1 On 
the basis of the foregoing, the district court found that 
Hammer was competent to waive his rights and that the 
waiver was voluntary. 
 
On October 9, 1998, the court entered an order 
discharging Hammer's counsel, appointing stand-by 
counsel for him, and fixing a sentencing date. On November 
4, 1998, the district court sentenced Hammer to die. A 
notice of appeal was filed on Hammer's behalf on November 
12, 1998. 
 
In the course of its opinion the court described the case 
as follows: 
 
        The evidence presented during the trial viewed in a 
       light most favorable to the government establishes that 
       Mr. Hammer bound each limb of Mr. Marti by using 
       the ruse that he would only slightly injure Mr. Marti 
       and obtain a transfer for Mr. Marti to another prison. 
       Mr. Hammer after rendering Mr. Marti helpless put Mr. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court also received extensive testimony from Hammer, 
strikingly similar to the statements he made to us, detailed infra. 
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       Marti in a sleeper hold. Testimony from a pathologist 
       established that Mr. Marti struggled in the restraints. 
       Once Mr. Marti was rendered unconscious by the 
       sleeper hold, Mr. Hammer strangled him with a 
       homemade cord. In recommending a sentence of death 
       the jury, as required by statute, found that the 
       government established beyond a reasonable doubt 
       that Mr. Hammer intentionally killed Mr. Marti. The 
       jury also found beyond a reasonable doubt the 
       following two statutory aggravating factors: (1) Mr. 
       Hammer previously had been convicted of two or more 
       State or Federal offenses punishable by a term of 
       imprisonment of more than one year and (2) Mr. 
       Hammer committed the murder of Mr. Marti after 
       substantial planning and premeditation. These two 
       statutory aggravating factors are supported by the 
       record. 
 
Id. at 520 (footnotes omitted). 
 
On November 27, 1998, Hammer filed a pro se motion to 
dismiss the appeal but on December 18, 1998, hefiled an 
application to withdraw that motion which we granted on 
December 30, 1998. On March 23, 1999, Hammer again 
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and by order of April 
16, 1999, we reserved decision on the motion. Then on July 
23, 1999, stand-by counsel on behalf of Hammer filed a 
motion to withdraw the motion to dismiss the appeal. On 
August 3, 1999, we granted the motion to withdraw the 
motion to dismiss the appeal and thus the case proceeded 
to the briefing stage. 
 
B. 
 
After opening briefing, Hammer on May 8, 2000,filed a 
pro se motion for immediate dismissal of his appeal. By our 
order dated May 11, 2000, we reserved decision on the 
motion. Subsequently, Hammer sought reconsideration of 
our May 11 order and unsuccessfully sought en banc 
consideration of his motion to dismiss. Thereafter, we 
entered an order reciting that we had examined the 
extensive record in the case and satisfied ourselves that 
there was no question of competency.2 We indicated, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We relied essentially on the record of proceedings in the district 
court. 
We also note however, that we received (from Hammer) records of 
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however, that we were concerned with the question of 
whether the Federal Death Penalty Statute, 18 U.S.C. 
SS 3591-98, permits an appeal to be waived. Accordingly, 
we appointed John J. Gibbons, Esq. as amicus curiae"to 
brief the question whether an appeal under the Federal 
Death Penalty statute may be waived by a competent 
defendant." We fixed a briefing schedule and directed the 
government to file a responsive brief to the amicus's brief. 
Moreover, we set argument for July 18, 2000, and directed 
the clerk of our court to determine if it would be possible 
for Hammer to appear at the argument from his place of 
confinement at USP/Terre Haute through video- 
conferencing. We provided that if video-conferencing was 
possible we would hear Hammer personally. Both the 
amicus and the government have filed briefs as we directed, 
the amicus contending that a waiver is not permissible, or 
at least, that one may not withdraw an appeal oncefiled, 
and the government contending the opposite. 
 
On June 30, 2000, Hammer filed a motion requesting 
that we deem that he had withdrawn his May 8, 2000, 
motion to dismiss the appeal or that we dismiss the motion 
to dismiss the appeal. In view of this motion we considered 
that the issue of whether the appeal could be dismissed 
probably was moot as we do not doubt that up until the 
argument date on July 18, 2000, we would have allowed 
Hammer to withdraw his motion to dismiss his appeal and 
thus would have heard the appeal on the merits. Then, in 
the final significant pre-argument development we received 
a letter dated July 11, 2000, on July 13, 2000, from 
Hammer that once again stated that he wanted the appeal 
dismissed. In the letter, after setting forth certain 
background information, Hammer recited the following: 
 
       Therefore, I urge this court to decide my Pro se Motion 
       to have my appeal dismissed and not to consider the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
subsequent regular psychiatric evaluations made by the medical staff at 
Lewisburg, which essentially established the existence of a continuum, 
in which Hammer's mental state was unchanged. We solicited the advice 
of all counsel (including stand-by counsel) but no one suggested that 
there was any question about Hammer's competency. 
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       issue moot. My only desire is to have the sentence of 
       death implemented expeditiously, and whatever 
       process or procedure that achieves this result fastest is 
       what I feel is best. 
 
C. 
 
The oral argument was held on July 18, 2000, as 
scheduled. Hammer was present by video-conferencing and 
he argued at length. The members of this panel, his stand- 
by counsel, government counsel, and counsel for the 
amicus curiae all were able to see and hear Hammer quite 
clearly. He spoke with great intelligence, logic, and force, 
addressed the legal issues with considerable skill, 
demonstrated a total command of the record, and was calm 
and in total control of himself. Furthermore, he spoke 
respectfully toward the court, his attorneys, and the amicus 
curiae. He demonstrated his command of the case by 
making very little use of notes. 
 
At the outset Hammer said that it had always been his 
intent "to be executed as promptly as possible."3 Thus, he 
complained about the delay in the proceedings, although he 
later acknowledged that he was in part responsible for the 
delay. He said that he wanted his appeal dismissed so he 
could be executed. Hammer represented that he never 
authorized the filing of the notice of appeal. As he described 
it, a notice of appeal was prepared by counsel on a"stand- 
by" basis, and filed without his consent, although he 
admitted that he subsequently acquiesced in it. He said 
that "the death penalty . . . is the law of the land." 
Moreover, he indicated that if anyone had been aggrieved 
by constitutional violations in his case it had been he but 
that he was willing to waive any violations and that no one 
else had standing to complain. 
 
Hammer stated that he had accepted responsibility for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Hammer later qualified this statement explaining that he had on 
occasion changed his mind when he received a letter from the mother of 
another death row inmate stating that, if he died, her son might too. 
However, Hammer always reverted to his original intent to waive an 
appeal and have the sentence of death carried out. 
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killing another human being, that there was no question 
but that he had killed Andrew Marti, and that he had a fair 
though not a perfect trial. He said the jury returned the 
verdict and that society had spoken through the 12 
members of the jury. He asked, how would society be 
protected if this appeal went forward? He then asked, how 
was the interest of justice being served by the appeal? He 
rejected the amicus's position that an appeal was 
mandatory. He indicated that if he had a choice to live he 
would do so but that he was not living, he merely was 
"existing" in a small confined area, with only brief time out 
for showers and exercise. He pointed out that he was 41 
years old and had been in prison for 22 years since he was 
a teenager except when he was on "escape status," and 
faced 1,000 plus years in jail. He said that he would die in 
prison, and preferred the certainty of knowing when and 
how he would die, describing lethal injection as simple and 
painless. He stated that he had read stand-by counsel's 
brief and in his view, the chance of winning on appeal is slim.4 
 
Hammer said that it was in his best interest to have the 
"sentence of death implemented as expeditiously as 
possible." He asked that, if we granted his motion to 
dismiss, we send the case back to the district court with 
instructions to schedule the execution. He said that if we 
leave the matter in the hands of the Justice Department or 
the Attorney General the case could linger and then"the 
President might get involved." 
 
He also said that he wanted to point out that his case 
was different than the cases of most people on death row 
because, in his words, he was the "politically correct 
execution candidate." He then explained his reasons for 
that conclusion which were that he is a "white man," the 
murder was inside a prison, he already was serving a huge 
amount of time, and his victim was white. Hammer also 
commented upon the current controversy over the death 
penalty, noting that he did not meet any of the criteria that 
the Justice Department was studying regarding the fairness 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Hammer even discussed the legal basis for the appeal and commented 
that almost all of the asserted grounds had been rejected by the 
jurisprudence, much of it by this court. 
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of its imposition, since there was no question of his guilt, 
reiterating that he had killed Andrew Marti. Moreover, he 
indicated that he had "absolutely no intention of seeking 
clemency from the President of the United States. I don't 
want to appeal. Obviously, I don't want clemency." 
 
Hammer then said he would only be free when he was 
dead, and he flatly denied that he was committing suicide. 
Rather, he said that he accepted the judgment of the court 
and the jury and that he accepted "responsibility for my 
actions, for my actions of killing Andrew Marti." Indeed he 
made an extraordinary plea for the imposition of the death 
penalty. He pointed out that it had been four years since he 
had murdered Marti. He said that if capital punishment is 
ever going to mean anything then it should be implemented 
in a time frame when people remember why it is being 
imposed. He argued that until the death penalty is changed 
"it should be implemented expeditiously." 
 
He then discussed the "cruel and unusual punishment" 
aspect of a capital case. He said that it was not cruel and 
unusual for him to take a few steps, lie down on a gurney, 
be strapped in and have drugs inserted into his veins. He 
said the act of dying is the easy part and that the cruel and 
unusual element of capital punishment is the mental and 
emotional torture and everything you put yourself through 
while you are waiting. 
 
Near the end of his statement he once again 
demonstrated that he accepted responsibility for his acts by 
saying that the only way he could make amends was to 
accept the punishment. The panel, of course, was mindful 
that Hammer had vacillated with respect to the prosecution 
of the appeal and thus at the end of Hammer's statement 
we asked him: 
 
       Are you saying to us that if we dismiss this appeal 
       you're not going to come back to us and ask us to hear 
       your appeal later? 
 
Hammer responded: 
 
       Yes, sir. 
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II. 
 
A. 
 
We deal initially with a point that the government raised 
in its brief filed on July 13, 2000, in which it argued that 
even though a defendant sentenced to die need not appeal, 
we should hold that "Hammer has irrevocably elected to 
proceed with the appeal." Br. at 6. The government took 
this position which, if accepted, would have resulted in our 
hearing the appeal on the merits, because it was concerned 
that if we dismissed the appeal Hammer later would 
contend that we should hear it. The government, however, 
prepared its brief after Hammer filed his June 30, 2000 
motion which sought an order leading us to hear his appeal 
but before he filed his July 11, 2000 letter requesting us to 
dismiss the appeal. The government cited St. Pierre v. 
Cowan, ___ F.3d ___, 2000 WL 862521 (7th Cir. June 28, 
2000), and Smith v. Armontrout, 865 F.2d 1502 (8th Cir. 
1988), as support for its argument. 
 
In considering the government's request, from which we 
note that in the light of Hammer's personal plea it 
somewhat retreated at oral argument, we treat Hammer's 
motion as a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. App. P. 42(b) 
which, as germane here, provides that "[a]n appeal may be 
dismissed on the appellant's motion on terms agreed to by 
the parties or fixed by the court." We are satisfied that we 
have discretion to grant, or to deny Hammer's motion as 
the government requested that we do in its brief. See 
Clarendon Ltd. v. Nu-West Indus., Inc., 936 F.2d 127, 128- 
30 (3d Cir. 1991); HCA Health Servs. of Virginia v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 957 F.2d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 
1992). We also note that Hammer's July 11, 2000 letter 
and his statements to this court on July 18, 2000, have 
changed the situation since the government made the 
request to us to hear the appeal on the merits. Hammer 
has without equivocation asked us to dismiss his appeal 
and has indicated that he will not change his mind with 
respect to his request. We are satisfied that the concerns 
the government has expressed about Hammer changing his 
mind do not require us to hear Hammer's appeal. Thus, we 
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will consider Hammer's motion to dismiss and will not hold 
that he has elected irrevocably to proceed with the appeal. 
 
B. 
 
Our determination with respect to the general exercise of 
discretion takes us to the issue on which we sought 
briefing: does the Federal Death Penalty statute preclude a 
defendant sentenced to death from waiving his right of 
appeal? We think that resolution of this issue bears upon 
the exercise of our discretion. The appeal provision of the 
statute, 18 U.S.C. S 3595 ("section 3595"), provides as 
follows (emphasis added): 
 
       (a) Appeal.--In a case in which a sentence of death is 
       imposed, the sentence shall be subject to review by the 
       court of appeals upon appeal by the defendant . Notice 
       of appeal must be filed within the time specified for the 
       filing of a notice of appeal. An appeal under this 
       section may be consolidated with an appeal of the 
       judgment of conviction and shall have priority over all 
       other cases. 
 
       (b) Review.--The court of appeals shall review the 
       entire record in the case, including-- 
 
       (1) the evidence submitted during the trial; 
 
       (2) the information submitted during the sentencing 
       hearing; 
 
       (3) the procedures employed in the sentencing 
       hearing; and 
 
       (4) the special findings returned under [18 U.S.C. S] 
       3593(d). 
 
       (c) Decision and disposition.-- 
 
       (1) The court of appeals shall address all substantive 
       and procedural issues raised on the appeal of a 
       sentence of death, and shall consider whether the 
       sentence of death was imposed under the influence 
       of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor 
       and whether the evidence supports the special 
       finding of the existence of an aggravating factor 
       required to be considered under [18 U.S.C. S] 3592. 
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       (2) Whenever the court of appeals finds that -- 
 
        (A) the sentence of death was imposed under the 
       influence of passion, prejudice, or any other 
       arbitrary factor; 
 
        (B) the admissible evidence and information 
       adduced does not support the special finding of the 
       existence of the required aggravating factor; or 
 
        (C) the proceedings involved any other legal error 
       requiring reversal of the sentence that was properly 
       preserved for appeal under the rules of criminal 
       procedure, 
 
       the court shall remand the case for reconsideration 
       under [18 U.S.C. S] 3593 or imposition of a sentence 
       other than death. The court of appeals shall not 
       reverse or vacate a sentence of death on account of any 
       error which can be harmless, including any erroneous 
       special finding of an aggravating factor, where the 
       Government establishes beyond a reasonable doubt 
       that the error was harmless. 
 
       (3) The court of appeals shall state in writing the 
       reasons for its disposition of an appeal of a sentence 
       of death under this section. 
 
It is, of course, immediately evident that section 3595 
authorizes but does not explicitly require an appeal by a 
defendant sentenced to death. The absence of such a 
requirement would seem to establish clearly that a 
defendant is not required to appeal a sentence of death. 
After all, in general, parties to federal litigation, whether 
civil or criminal, need not appeal adverse verdicts. Thus, if 
Congress had intended to reverse this usual practice surely 
it would have said so. Moreover, in Whitmore v. Arkansas, 
495 U.S. 149, 166, 173, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1729, 1733 
(1990), Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion indicated 
that "[s]ociety's overwhelming interest in preventing 
wrongful executions is evidenced by the fact that almost all 
of the 37 States with the death penalty apparently have 
prescribed mandatory, nonwaivable appellate review of at 
least the sentence in capital cases." The Supreme Court 
decided Whitmore in 1990, yet when Congress enacted 
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section 3595 in 1994 (see Pub. L. 103-322, Title VI, 
S 60002(a), 108 Stat. 1967), it did not in terms require 
mandatory review of a death sentence although Justice 
Marshall's dissent spelled out the state practices. 
 
Amicus seeks to overcome the absence of a requirement 
for an appeal in section 3595 by a strained reading of the 
section. Section 3595(a) provides initially that"[i]n a case in 
which a sentence of death is imposed, the sentence shall be 
subject to review by the court of appeals upon appeal by 
the defendant. Notice of appeal must be filed within the 
time specified for the filing of a notice of appeal." The first 
quoted sentence plainly establishes as a prerequisite to the 
exercise of appellate jurisdiction that the defendant appeal. 
While it is true that the next sentence provides that 
"[n]otice of appeal must be filed" within the specified time, 
that provision is a limitation on when a defendant may 
appeal rather than an affirmative command to him to do so 
and even the able amicus curiae does not contend 
otherwise in his brief. After all, if Congress had intended 
that there be a mandatory review of death penalty 
proceedings it had no need to provide that this sentence 
was "subject to review . . . upon appeal of the defendant." 
Instead, it simply could have provided for automatic review, 
as do many (but not all) states. 
 
Amicus seeks to overcome the plain import of section 
3595 by pointing out that section 3595(b) provides that the 
"court of appeals shall review the entire record in the case" 
and that section 3595(c)(1) provides that the court of 
appeals "shall address all substantive and procedural 
issues raised on the appeal of a sentence of death, and 
shall consider whether the sentence of death was imposed 
under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other 
arbitrary factor and whether the evidence supports the 
special finding of the existence of an aggravating factor 
required to be considered under [18 U.S.C. S] 3592." 
Amicus notes that the Act charges the Court with making 
these determinations even if the death-sentenced prisoner 
has not raised them. These provisions, however, are not an 
independent source of appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, they 
do nothing more than specify the scope of review when an 
appeal is filed. Along the same lines, section 3595(c)(2), 
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which provides that upon making certain findings the court 
of appeals shall remand the matter to the district court, 
becomes operative only when appellate jurisdiction is 
invoked in the first instance. 
 
For all the foregoing reasons we conclude that we have 
discretion to either grant or deny Hammer's motion to 
dismiss his appeal and that there is no reason attributable 
to the text of the Federal Death Penalty Act to exercise our 
discretion under Rule 42(b) to deny Hammer's motion to 
dismiss the appeal.5 
 
We have considered in this regard amicus's argument 
that to avoid a conflict with the Eighth Amendment the 
Federal Death Penalty Act "precludes a capital defendant 
from waiving direct appellate review of his death sentence." 
Br. at 4. For a number of reasons the Eighth Amendment 
argument is unavailing. The death penalty is not inherently 
a punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment. See 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-87, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 
2926-32 (1976). While the Supreme Court has discussed 
the importance of making appellate review available to 
defendants, see, e.g., Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 32, 
111 S.Ct. 731, 739 (1991) (discussing the "crucial role of 
meaningful appellate review in ensuring that the death 
penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or irrationally"), it never 
has suggested that this right cannot be waived. Cf. Pulley 
v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871 (1984). In Harris, the 
Court upheld the California death penalty statute which 
had no provision for proportionality review. It noted that 
several, but not all, of state death penalty statutes provided 
for (1) proportionality review; and (2) an automatic appeal. 
It concluded that the former was not constitutionally 
necessary, and made no comment about the latter. See id. 
at 44-45, 104 S.Ct. at 876. Furthermore, the Court never 
has allowed that society at large has a constitutionally 
cognizable interest in appellate review of capital sentences. 
See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 
(rejecting third party attempt to raise appeal on defendant's 
behalf); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 97 S.Ct. 436 (1976) 
(same). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Indeed, it would seem strange for the Act to require Hammer to 
pursue an appeal that it did not oblige him to file. 
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C. 
 
In concluding our opinion we thank the amicus curiae 
and the members of his firm for ably advancing the 
positions that an appeal is mandatory under the Federal 
Death Penalty statute when the death penalty is imposed 
and that we should not dismiss this appeal. Nevertheless, 
as the foregoing discussion makes clear, Hammer is a 
confessed murderer who not only pleaded guilty but also 
obtained what he believes was a fair trial on the penalty 
phase of the case. Moreover, it does not appear that any 
other person has a legally-cognizable interest in these 
proceedings. At all events, we have carefully considered the 
entire record and concluded that, in the circumstances, the 
interests of justice do not require that he be compelled to 
appeal or that we review the district court proceedings on 
the merits. We have considered the options, but are 
satisfied that the proper course is to exercise our discretion 
to grant Hammer's motion to dismiss. The appeal will be 
dismissed. The case will be remanded to the district court 
to fix an early new date for the implementation of the 
sentence of death. 
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